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1 Introduction
Much of what is known about the production effects of climate change comes from agricultural
studies (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2014). Broadly speaking, two approaches have evolved for investi-
gating the effects of weather on agricultural production. One, often referred to as the "production-
function" or "agronomic" approach, uses experimental data to construct a "production function"
that incorporates climatic factors. These production functions are then combined with data from
climate-change models to approximate possible climatic effects upon production levels (see for ex-
ample, Adams 1989; Adams et al. 1990; Rosenzweig and Parry 1994). Another, often referred to
as Ricardian, relates economic returns from farming to weather variates econometrically and then
links those results to climate-change models (see for example, Mendelsohn, Nordhaus, and Shaw
1994; Schlenker, Hanemann, and Fisher 2005; Deschênes and Greenstone 2007; Fisher, Hanemann,
Roberts, and Schlenker 2012; Yang and Shumway 2016).
This paper examines the interrelationship between weather variates and agricultural production
from a different perspective. It examines the interplay between aggregate agricultural productivity
measures and weather variates. US agriculture offers a peculiarly appropriate laboratory for such
an analysis because it has proven capable of continuously increasing aggregate production with
minimal increases in aggregate input use. This tendency, first noted almost seven decades ago by
Barton and Cooper (1948), has now persisted for a century (Barton and Cooper 1948; Ball, Wang,
Nehring, and Mosheim 2015) and distinguishes agriculture from many other industrial sectors where
the primary driver of production growth is input growth (Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 2005).1
Working from Abramovitz’s (1956) hypothesis that the measured difference between output
growth and input growth, the so-called Solow residual, was a "measure of our ignorance", early
agricultural productivity studies strove to eliminate this residual. These early efforts culminated
in Griliches (1963). His classic analysis emphasized the importance of changes in input quality
and economies of scale rather than technical change in explaining observed productivity growth.
Since that time, however, US agriculture has undergone a massive consolidation. Moreover, the
quality corrections advocated by Griliches’(1960; 1963) were long ago incorporated into total factor
productivity (TFP) calculations. But the residual remains, and the conventional wisdom is that
most of aggregate US agricultural output growth results from technical progress (Jorgenson, Ho,
Stiroh 2005; Wang, Heisey, Schimmelfpfennig, and Ball 2015).
Although US agricultural productivity has grown steadily, that growth has become quite vari-
able. Figure 1, which depicts annual growth rates of US agricultural TFP from 1948-2013, illus-
trates. Prior to 1970, growth was relatively stable. But around 1970, it became less stable. Some of
this instability is attributable to external factors including the first and second oil shocks and gov-
1While aggregate agricultural input use has remained remarkably stable for almost a century, the composition of
that aggregate input has changed markedly over the last 40 years as the usage of intermediate inputs has steadily
supplanted both capital (including land) and labor in the aggregate input. Ball, Wang, Nehring, and Mosheim (2015)
contains a detailed discussion of this changing composition.
1
ernment production-reduction programs. But even after adjusting for these factors, US agricultural
TFP growth after 1990 was clearly more variable than it had been prior to 1970.
Another perspective on the same phenomenon comes from examining US state-level agricultural
TFP patterns. In Figure 2, we have plotted smoothed estimated kernel densities for state-level agri-
cultural TFP for each of the 48 contiguous US states over two 14-year time periods 1961-1974 and
1991-2004. As demonstrated by the apparent mean shift, average state-level TFP grew dramatically
between these two periods. Given the observed level of national agricultural productivity growth,
this mean shift is to be expected. But the 1991-2004 TFP distribution is also more platykurtic than
that for 1961-1974. In the 1961-1974 period the observed kurtosis is 6.9647,2 with a standard error
of 0.1882 indicative of a leptokurtic distribution with a long, fat tail. For 1991-2004, the calculated
kurtosis is 3.5515 indicative of a slightly leptokurtic and more symmetric distribution.
A natural suspect for this increased variability is weather. There seems little doubt that US
weather patterns changed during the last half of the 20th century. And some empirical evidence
suggests that regional weather patterns play a significant role in explaining national-level agricul-
tural TFP variability (Liang, Wu, Chambers et al. 2017). But even though weather-determined
factors, such as precipitation, are inputs to agricultural production, they are typically excluded in
agricultural TFP calculations. Thus, while offi cial statistics account for inputs, such as climate-
control and irrigation, that are devoted to mitigating the effects of adverse weather outcomes, the
weather events driving these expenditures are absent from the accounting.
This paper investigates the interaction between US state-level agricultural TFP growth and
weather outcomes using growth-accounting techniques. The focus is on determining whether that
interaction was different at the end of the 20th century than in the 1960s. To that end, United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) state-level productivity data for 1960-2004 are combined
with matching data on growing degree days and moisture (Schlenker and Roberts 2008, 2009). The
combined data are used to construct an aggregate agricultural production frontier that incorporates
observed weather variates into the empirical approximation of the technology. The constructed
frontier is used to decompose observed state-level agricultural TFP growth into four components:
technical change, weather-related shifts in the frontier, aggregate input growth, and adaptation to
the frontier.
The productivity frontier is developed using mathematical programming techniques. These
techniques do not require specific assumptions on economic behavior or functional form. The
analysis focuses on comparing agricultural TFP performance during two 14-year sub-periods 1961-
74 and 1991-2004 that correspond to the beginning and the end of our sample period. The periods
are chosen to omit the policy-driven shocks to agricultural TFP of the Payment-In-Kind (PIK)
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agricultural programs of the early 1980s. The empirical analysis suggests that the perceived changes
in state-level TFP growth as captured by its average and its distribution can largely be attributed
to technical change and changes in the pattern of states adopting existing technical improvements.
And while weather-related effects are important for some key states, weather effects on the average
state-level TFP growth and on the distribution of TFP growth appear minimal.
In what follows, the basic model is developed. The process by which state-level data is used to
construct an approximation to the agricultural production frontier is detailed. The traditional TFP
measure is decomposed, using index method techniques, into four parts relative to that frontier.
The four parts are a weather index, an index of technical change, an effi ciency or adaptation
measure, and a measure of true TFP or scale effects. We then briefly discuss a computational issue
associated with our approach and how that issue can be used to infer information about weather-
related effects. The empirical analysis then follows. Average results, results for the distributions of
the various measures, and results for four subgroups of states are then discussed. The paper then
concludes.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Constructing the Productivity Frontier
Our data consist of annual observations for the period 1960-2004 for the 48 contiguous US states
on total agricultural output, total agricultural input, and two measured weather variates. The
first weather variate consists of state-level observations on degree days (DD) between 8o and 30o
Celsius between March and August, and the second consists of inches of precipitation over the same
period.3
The essential idea is to use these data to construct an empirical approximation to the aggregate
production technology relating aggregate output to the aggregate input measures and weather
variates. By incorporating weather variates as inputs to the production process, we recognize the
fundamentally stochastic nature of agricultural production that derives from its dependence upon
physical inputs that are beyond the producer’s control. This contrasts strongly with many existing
studies of agricultural TFP that are built upon a model of a nonstochastic technology that denies
the essential nature of agricultural production.4
To approximate the technology underlying these data, we rely on techniques originally developed
3All of our data were obtained from V. Eldon Ball of the Economic Research Service, United States Department
of Agriculture to whom we are deeply indebted.
4A sizable literature has evolved on attempting to explain measured aggregate agricultural TFP. Alston, Norton,
and Pardey (1995) provide a thorough introduction and explanation of the approach and the technical issues involved.
The basic approach is to construct an aggregate TFP measure and then in a second stage use regression analysis to
relate those measures to potential "explanatory variables" or "productivity drivers", some of which include weather
variates.
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by Farrell (1957) and Afriat (1972) as extended by a number of authors under the general rubrics of
"nonparametric productivity analysis" and "data envelopment analysis" (Charnes, Cooper, Golany,
Seiford, and Stutz 1985; Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell, and Pasurka 1989; Färe, Grosskopf, Lovell, and
Yaisawarng 1993; Byrnes, Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell, 1988; Kumar and Russell 2002; Henderson
and Russell 2005).5 The basic idea behind this approach, which has its ultimate roots in the activity-
analysis model of Koopmans (1951), is that each observed input-output combination (process) can
be recognized as one manifestation of the feasible technology. That underlying technology is then
approximated by incorporating these observed processes with basic axioms of production to arrive
at a conservative approximation to the underlying technology. The ultimate result is an approxi-
mation that can be expressed completely in terms of inequalities involving linear combinations of
the observed processes. That polyhedral approximation to the technology can be analyzed using
relatively simple mathematical programming techniques.
The first step is to envelop the observed data on output, inputs, and weather variates by
taking their convex hull (the smallest convex set containing all the observed data points). This
envelopment gives the smallest set of outputs, inputs, and weather variates that are consistent
with the observed data and the existence of convex production technology. This convex hull thus
represents the most conservative approximation to the data consistent with a convex technology.
After that envelopment is accomplished, additional assumptions on the underlying technology are
invoked to extend that approximation.
Denote aggregate agricultural output for the kth state at time t by ytk, aggregate agricultural
input use for the kth state at time t by xtk, and the two-vector of measured weather variates for
the kth state at time t by wtk. The convex hull of these observations is given by
C (t) =
{

















k=1 µjk, µjk ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , t
}
.
The next step in forming the approximation is to assume that if a particular (y, x, w) is technically
feasible any radial contraction of that (y, x, w) is also technically feasible. Intuitively, this ensures
that the approximation to the technology does not exhibit increasing returns and that inaction is
technically feasible.6 Mathematically, this is accomplished by replacing the µjk "activity variates"
in C (t) with new activity variates, call them λjk, while requiring the latter’s sum to be less than
or equal to one as opposed to one for the former. The result is
N (t) =
{

















k=1 λjk, λjk ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , t
}
5Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994) contains a relatively complete survey in textbook form of the early economic
work on nonparametric productivity analysis. After the contribution of Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), a
closely related literature has developed in parallel in the area of operations research. These contributions have been
summarized in Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford (1994).
6See the discussion in the Infeasibilities section for more on this assumption.
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The final step is to impose "free disposability" of (y, x) upon the observations. This is accomplished
by converting the equalities in N (t) relating to (y, x) into weak inequalities. In intuitive terms, this
ensures that the marginal product of x in producing y is nonnegative. The resulting approximation
to the technology at time t is
T (t) =
{

















k=1 λjk, λjk ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , t
}
There are several things to note. First, free disposability is not imposed upon the weather
variates in our approximation to the technology. This reflects the fact that either too much heat or
too much moisture applied to a fixed x can be destructive to the agricultural production process. In
fact, one of the main biological problems associated with plant growth is heat stress while another is
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Second, technical change is assumed to be progressive, that is, for t′ > t, T (t) ⊆ T (t′) . This can
be ascertained by noting, for example, that T (1) is constructed from the state-level observations for
the 48 contiguous states for the first-year in the sample. T (2) is based on the observations used in
T (1) plus the observations from the second year and so on. Our rationale for imposing progressive
technical change is simple. It seems impossible to believe that technical know how for a given set
of inputs (including weather, climate conditions, etc.) would degrade in modern times. As Kumar
and Russell (2002) memorably queried: "Does knowledge decay? Were "blueprints" lost?"
Because confusion appears to exist in some quarters on this issue, it is important to empha-
size that this claim presumes proper accounting of all factors affecting production. It is clear, for
example, that certain practices can degrade the natural-resource base to preclude achieving pre-
vious levels of yields from application of a given bundle of variable inputs (including weather and
other climate-controlled factors). Soil exhaustion by improper rotational techniques is an obvious
example from agriculture. In some quarters, this has been perceived as technical regression. That
is incorrect. Properly speaking, such examples do not constitute a change in what is technically
possible from a given bundle of inputs, but either a degraded quasi-fixed factor of production or a
degraded flow from such a factor. Modern accounting practices for quasi-fixed inputs, such as land
and capital, make explicit corrections using hedonic and other methods in an attempt to ensure
measured resource flow units are consistently defined from one period to the next (Ball, Wang, and
Nehring 2015).
From this representation of the underlying technology, we can construct the following represen-
tation of the maximal feasible output at time t as conditioned by aggregate input and the weather
variates as





















2.2 The Components of TFP Change
Because the empirical procedure relies on enveloping observed data, some observations will fall
below the piece-wise linear approximation to the productivity frontier. The observations that lie
inside the productivity frontier are usually construed as being technically ineffi cient. A measure of
that ineffi ciency is given by the ratio
Et (yt, xt, wt) =
yt
ft (xt, wt)
that relates observed output, yt, to the maximal feasible output for (xt,wt) , ft (xt, wt). If Et (yt, xt, wt) =
1, it reflects "state-of-the-art" performance relative to that frontier signalling that the state in ques-
tion has completely adapted to existing technical possibilities. If Et (yt, xt, wt) < 1, its adaptation
to the best-practice frontier remains imperfect.
Using Et (yt, xt, wt) and decomposition techniques pioneered by Färe, Grosskopf, Norris, and
Zhang (1994), Kumar and Russell (2002), and Henderson and Russell (2005) observed changes in
a TFP index over time can be decomposed into four components. At time t, the index of TFP
relative to the base period 0 is defined by7
TFP (t, 0) ≡ yt/xt
y0/x0
.




Et (yt, xt, wt) ft (xt, wt)x0
E0 (y0, x0, w0) f0 (x0, w0)xt
=
(
f0 (xt, wt) ft (xt, wt)




ft (x0, w0) ft (xt, wt)




f0 (xt, w0) /xt
f0 (x0, w0) /x0
ft (xt, w0) /xt
ft (x0, w0) /x0
) 1
2 Et (yt, xt, wt)
E0 (y0, x0, w0)
.
The second equality breaks the observed index into four separate measures.8
7Given the presence of w in f, the "TFP" measure that we employ is more appropriately interpreted as a partial-
productivity measure giving the "productivity of x”. A true total factor productivity measure would directly incor-
porate the weather variates into the calculation of the aggregate input. However, y/x is the standard or conventional
TFP measure as calculated by USDA, and so we adhere to that naming convention in our discussion.
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Et (yt, xt, wt) ft (x0, w0) ft (xt, wt) ft (xt, w0)x0
E0 (y0, x0, w0) f0 (x0, w0) ft (xt, w0) ft (x0, w0)xt
,
decompose observed productivity growth into a technical change index, a weather index, and an effi ciency component.
In the former, the weather index is ft(xt,wt)
ft(xt,w0)
while in the latter it is f0(xt,wt)
f0(xt,w0)
. One describes the weather effect relative
to the t-relevant technology and the other to the 0-relevant technology. The same is true for the index of the aggregate
input effect. Similarly for the technical change index, one makes the comparison for the t-relevant data and the other
for 0-relevant data. In each case, either a different data point or a different f is used as the base of comparison, and
will typically result in different measures much in the same manner that more traditional Laspeyres and Paasche
indices differ from one another. And unless the underlying technology satisfies a restrictive neutrality condition, the
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The first measure, (
f0 (xt, wt) ft (xt, wt)




is the geometric average of two measures of how changes in w affect maximal production at time
t and at time 0 holding aggregate input utilization fixed at xt.9 We refer to it as the weather
component of the productivity index.
The second component, (
ft (x0, w0) ft (xt, wt)




represents the geometric average of the shift in the production function between 0 and t as evaluated
at the observed aggregate input and weather variates for 0 and t. We refer to it as the technical
change component of the productivity index.
The third component, the input component of the productivity index,(
f0 (xt, w0) /xt
f0 (x0, w0) /x0
ft (xt, w0) /xt
ft (x0, w0) /x0
) 1
2
is the geometric average of the index of total factor productivity for input xt relative to x0 computed
using maximal feasible output for the 0 period technology (holding weather fixed at w0),
f0 (xt, w0) /xt
f0 (x0, w0) /x0
,
and the same TFP index computed for the t period technology,
ft (xt, w0) /xt
ft (x0, w0) /x0
Each component differs from TFP (t, 0) by replacing observed output with maximal feasible output
(holding w0 fixed). Thus, each component may be thought of as the potential TFP of xt relative
to x0 for the respective technologies. A standard computation, however, also shows that if average
product, fk (x,w) /x for k = 0, t , is increasing in x, some economies of scale in x exist as one moves
along the maximal output frontier holding w constant. Thus, if, say, ft(xt,w0)/xtft(x0,w0)/x0 > 1, it provides
evidence of exploitation of existing scale economies in x for technology t.
resulting decompositions will differ. Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982), Färe, Grosskopf, Norris, and Zhang
(1994), and Kumar and Russell (2002) suggest resolving the resulting indeterminacy by using the "Fisher ideal"
version of the two measures. Adopting that suggestion results in the geometric averaging procedure.
9Another possibility is to hold the input bundle constant at x0,(
f0 (x0, wt) ft (x0, wt)




in computing the weather index. This measure can be geometrically averaged with the current measure to generate
an even more general weather index. But as a practical matter, this construction exacerbates the infeasibility problem
discussed below and so was avoided.
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The final component of the decomposition,
Et (yt, xt, wt)
E0 (y0, x0, w0)
compares the relative effi ciency with which the technology is used in time t and in time 0. If it is
greater than one, the state has moved closer to the frontier between time 0 and time t signalling
adaptation to changing technical practice. If it is less than one, the state has moved further away
from the frontier, signalling failure to keep up with the "best-practice" technology.
Logarithmic differences in agricultural TFP, which approximate percentage changes, between t






= T∆t,0 (wt, w0, xt, x0) +W∆t,0 (wt, w0, xt, x0) +X∆t,0 (wt, w0, xt, x0)
+E∆t,0 (yt, y0, wt, w0, xt, x0) ,
where the technical change indicator is
T∆t,0 (wt, w0, xt, x0) =
1
2
[ln ft (xt, wt)− ln f0 (xt, wt) + ln ft (x0, w0)− ln f0 (x0, w0)] ,
the weather change indicator is
W∆t,0 (wt, w0, xt, x0) =
1
2
[ln ft (xt, wt)− ln ft (xt, w0) + ln f0 (xt, wt)− ln f0 (xt, w0)] ,
the input change indicator is,
X∆t,0 (wt, w0, xt, x0) =
1
2
[ln (ft (xt, w0)x0)− ln (ft (x0, w0)xt) + ln (f0 (xt, w0)x0)− ln (f0 (x0, w0)xt)]
and the effi ciency change indicator is
E∆t,0 (yt, y0, wt, w0, xt, x0) = lnEt (yt, xt, wt)− lnE0 (y0, x0, w0) .
2.3 Infeasibilities
Because we do not require the weather inputs to be freely disposable and because our empirical
technique uses conservative methods to approximate the technology as applied to a panel of data,
the possibility arises that some components of our decomposition of TFP change (TFP∆) may not
be calculable for certain time periods. The basic problem can be illustrated by considering two data
points for, say, a single state taken at different points in time. Figure 3 illustrates the situation.
There we have treated the weather variates as though they can be combined into a single variable
that is measured along the axis labelled w. The aggregate agricultural input is measured along the
axis labelled x and the aggregate output is measured along the axis measured y. The two points
are presented in Figure 3a as (w0, x0, y0) and (wt, xt, yt) and we presume that 0 is the base period
that precedes period t.
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Under our maintained assumptions, the approximation to the period 0 technology would be
given by the shaded area in Figure 3b. Because the input pair (xt, wt) falls outside of that shaded
area, it is not consistent with producing any output using the 0 approximation to the technology. In
such instances components of the productivity decomposition, for example, ft (wt, xt) /f0 (wt, xt),
are not calculable.
Such problems could be resolved by using "less conservative" approximating procedures. For
example, if one imposes free disposability upon the weather variate, the 0 approximation to the
technology now extends parallel to the w axis (at vertical level y0) towards the bottom of the figure
(see panel c of Figure 3). And, one can now calculate f0 (wt, xt) using this "less conservative"
approximation. But making this extension requires imposing global structure on a technology that
is known to be repeatedly violated. For that reason, it is avoided in our empirical analysis.
The empirical presence of infeasibilities is more than just a technical diffi culty. It communicates
information, albeit conservatively, about the changing structure of technical possibilities. As Figure
3b illustrates, components of the decomposition are not calculable because (wt, xt) falls outside the
range of actual experience at time 0. And thus incorporating it into the technology approximation
for time 0 requires extrapolating beyond practical experience. This, of course, can be achieved
by imposing appropriate statistical structure and fitting curves. But that requires making further
assumptions beyond ours on the structure of the technology. In particular, it necessitates choosing
a functional specification for the technology. And such choices are typically made on the basis of
computational tractability rather than on physical plausibility.
3 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis focuses on two sub periods 1961-1974 and 1991-2004. There are different
ways to examine long-term, productivity-growth patterns. For example, one might simply choose
the first observed period and the last observed period and perform productivity analysis across that
44 year period. Weather, however, is notoriously variable, and such a procedure risks misstating
long-term weather effects as a result of choosing the comparison points. For that reason, our long-
term productivity comparisons and decompositions were made across 14 different 30-year time
horizons that were chosen to match our first and second sub-period. Before we look at those
comparisons, we first examine each state’s productivity performance relative to the productivity
frontier in both sub periods.
3.1 Performance Relative to the Productivity Frontier and Adaptation
Table 1 presents summary information on calculated effi ciency scores for each contiguous state for
the sub periods 1961-1974 and 1991-2004. States with effi ciency scores close to 1 are on or very
near the productivity frontier. States with effi ciency scores less than 1 fall inside the productivity
frontier. Because the empirical methodology uses states on the productivity frontier to construct
9
the empirical envelope of the observed data, it is reasonable to interpret the relatively effi cient states
as operating technical processes that determine the placement of the frontier, which describes best
available technical practices. These are the states that have done the best job of adapting to
the overall operating environment including weather patterns as captured by the measured weather
variates. States lying below the frontier are less well adapted to changing technological possibilities.
The further inside the frontier, the less well the state has adapted to the technical environment.
Six states (Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Rhode Island, and Texas) have average effi ciency
scores exceeding .9 for both of the sample periods. Arizona is a geographically large southwestern
state, but in 2012 it ranked 32 (out of 50) in terms of value of agricultural production. Therefore,
in production value terms it is on the small side. Its primary commodities are cattle, milk, animal
forage, and lettuce. California is the largest agricultural state in production-value terms and has
perhaps the most diverse agriculture in the United States with heavy concentrations in fruits and
nuts, dairy products, vegetables, and livestock (cattle). Iowa ranks second in production-value
terms and is heavily concentrated in corn, soybean, and livestock (hogs and cattle) production.
Florida falls slightly above the national average in value terms ($8.46 billion in 2014). Its primary
crops are oranges, nursery products, and vegetables. Rhode Island is the smallest of the 48 con-
tiguous states in value terms ($75 million in 2014) and its minuscule production is concentrated in
nursery products.10 In 2012, Texas ranked third overall in value of agricultural production behind
California and Iowa. It ranked first in livestock production value with livestock accounting for
approximately three quarters of its total production value.
Arizona (3), California (2), Florida (1), and Iowa (4) had the four highest measured TFPs at
the beginning our sample (1960). At the beginning, calculated TFP for California and Florida was
virtually identical at .8643 and .8649 (base year 1996), respectively. Arizona at .7057 and Iowa
at .6733 fell somewhat further behind these two leaders. At the end of the sample, California’s
measured TFP was approximately 1.8 while Florida’s stood at 1.63 after having peaked at 1.79 in
2001. Iowa’s measured TFP was 1.5297 which tied it with Illinois for third highest. Arizona’s TFP
stood at 1.38 and (11th overall), and Texas had fallen to 43rd (falling from 24th in 1960) in terms
of measured TFP by 2004.
Early in the sample, Arizona was both highly effi cient, well adapted to the technical environ-
ment, and highly productive. At the end of the sample, it remained well adapted to the changing
technical environment, but its position as a productivity leader had clearly eroded. Rhode Island,
on the other hand, stood 35th in terms of productivity in 1960 but had risen to 8th in 2004. So
where it once was an also-ran in terms of TFP, it was emerging as a productivity leader by the end
of the sample. Nevertheless, because of its very small geographical size, its continued presence at or
near the frontier may seem unusual. One interpretation is that smallness is mainly attributable to
its small agricultural "plant size" and not to the ineffi ciency with which it conducts its agricultural
industry. Regardless, Rhode Island’s agricultural operation is so tiny relative to the rest of US
10Alaska, which is not in our sample, has an even smaller agricultural sector.
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agriculture, approximately .01% of total production value, that developments in that state cannot
reasonably be interpreted as driving developments for production agriculture.
Figure 4 depicts smoothed kernel density estimates for computed effi ciency scores for the two
sub periods. The 1961-1974 distribution is clearly bimodal. Effi ciency scores are concentrated both
in the neighborhood of 1 and slightly below the sample mean of approximately .71. The 1991-2004
distribution is also bimodal but appears to have shifted to the left, the new mean is approximately
.68 and less mass is concentrated in the neighborhood of 1 and more mass is concentrated in the
very low effi ciency scores.
This bimodality is evocative of a relatively small "breakaway pack" of innovative and technically
effi cient states followed by a much larger "peloton" of less innovative and less effi cient states. It
suggests that the breakaway pack forges the main technical innovations that advance the productiv-
ity frontier to which the larger peloton adapts. The perceived loss of mass in the neighborhood of 1
suggests that US agricultural innovation became increasingly concentrated between 1961-1974 and
1991-2004. Fewer states were performing in a manner that could be perceived as well adapted to
the operating environment, and an increasing number of states were exhibiting technical operations
that would be classed as poorly adapted to the operating environment.
There are different possible explanations. One is that innovative states make innovations that
are peculiarly appropriate and increasingly specialized for their agricultures. Such innovations
may not spillover immediately into other states. The perceived shift towards a smaller breakaway
pack could signal that as agricultural technologies become increasingly refined, innovations become
increasingly specific to the commodities for which they are targeted. For example, innovations
made in the mechanical harvesting of tree crops, such as almonds, likely have little or no spillover
effects for row agriculture. Conversely, improvements in procedures for the planting and tilling of
row crops may bring few benefits to producers of tree crops.
Another relates to what measured "effi ciency" captures. It measures distance to a common
frontier constructed by enveloping the observed data. That frontier rationalizes observed input-
output combinations under a set of regularity conditions placed on the underlying hypothetical
technology. Consequently, measured ineffi ciency can have other explanations besides simple eco-
nomic incompetence. It also reflects lags involved in adapting or adopting technical improvements
made in one state to the needs and capabilities of other states with similar agricultural plants.
Beyond that measured ineffi ciency undoubtedly also incorporates elements of heterogeneity that
would be relegated to an error term in an econometric framework. And some of these may have
little to do directly with the underlying technology, particularly if they reflect institutional or reg-
ulatory differences between states. Thus, another interpretation is that the perceived shift in the
effi ciency distribution is a consequence of US agriculture becoming increasingly heterogeneous and,
possibly, increasingly specialized.
Similar observations elsewhere have inspired a vast literature that uses a two-stage procedure
to estimate and then explain measured ineffi ciency. In the first stage, data envelopment procedures
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are used to measure ineffi ciency, and in the second stage measured ineffi ciency is regressed upon
a set of explanatory variables. Simar and Wilson (2007) both review and propose an alternative
approach to this literature. Because our intent is not to explain the potential sources of ineffi ciency,
we make no attempt to undertake a detailed econometric investigation of measured effi ciency. Still,
one cannot help but notice that both the moisture variate and the temperature variate also exhibit
bimodality over these periods (Figure 5). The hypothesis that some of this measured ineffi ciency
is attributable to changing weather patterns seems natural.
To investigate this potential relation, we estimated three different bias-corrected regression
models relating measured effi ciency to our temperature and moisture variates. One model was
estimated for the whole sample period (1961-2004), and one each for the two sub-periods. The
bias-corrected regression procedure is due to Kneip, Simar, and Wilson (2015).11 Results are
reported in Table 2.
Overall, the weather variates explain only a tiny percentage of measured ineffi ciency. Thus, the
bulk of this measured ineffi ciency seems attributable to other sources of heterogeneity. Nonetheless,
the estimated coeffi cients in each case appear to be significantly different from zero at all traditional
levels of significance and suggest that measured effi ciency is positively correlated with the moisture
variate but negatively correlated with the temperature variate.
From these results, we can infer that relatively fewer states are well adapted to low-moisture
operating conditions than ones that are well-adapted to higher-moisture operating conditions. For
example, one might expect states operating in chronically arid environments to have arranged quasi-
fixed-input infrastructure to permit relatively productive operation even when rainfall is low. Such
infrastructural arrangements might include investment in surface irrigation and pumping facilities
(Schlenker, Hanemann, and Fisher 2005). On the other hand, states that typically operate in more
moist conditions, may find it very diffi cult to make short-run adjustments to drought-induced lack
of rainfall. The short-run empirical consequence might be a perceived drop in measured effi ciency
relative to the enveloping production frontier. And when production conditions returned to more
normal moisture levels, that short-run measured ineffi ciency might disappear.
These results also suggest that measured ineffi ciency is higher when temperatures approach
extreme levels. Again one plausible inference is that relatively few states have agricultural plants
that are well adapted to operating at extreme temperatures. Thus, few states will operate near the
production-frontier envelope for those higher temperatures. And when other states are exposed to
such extreme temperatures as a result of variability in their weather patterns, short-run adjustments
11The bias correction is needed to correct for the manner in which the effi ciency scores are generated and their one-
sided nature (Kneip, Simar, and Wilson 2015). The procedure relies on a jackknife bias correction. The jackknife bias
correction is calculated by averaging over independent estimators, obtained from independent subsets of the original
sample. The original sample is split into two subsamples by dividing the states in two groups. All observations relative
to a state are all in one of the two subsamples. The effi ciency calculation is repeated in each subset separately and two
associated regression estimates are obtained. The jackknife bias estimate is obtained by averaging these estimates.
This bias estimate is used to correct the original regression estimate.
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are diffi cult to make and the empirical result is relatively large measured ineffi ciencies. On the other
hand, more states appear to be well adapted to lower or more moderate temperature patterns and
thus will tend to operate closer to the boundary of the production frontier when those weather
conditions occur.
3.2 The Observed Components of Agricultural TFP Growth
Our productivity growth calculations were carried out for 14 30-year periods (1961-1991, 1962-
1992,..., 1974-2004). TFP change and its components were calculated for each of these 30-year
time periods for each of the 48 states in the sample.12
Figure 6 presents smoothed kernel density estimates for TFP change and each of its four compo-
nents. Over the 48 contiguous states, the 30-year period TFP growth rates averaged approximately
49.6% suggesting that the average state could get approximately 1.5 times more output from the
same input base in, for example, 1991 than it could in 1961. As is evidenced by panel a in Figure
6, productivity growth appears unimodal around the observed mean with a calculated kurtosis of
3.0504.
Turning to the components of that TFP change, one sees quite different patterns emerge for each
component. The observed distributions for X∆ and W∆ appear quite leptokurtic around means
of approximately .2% and −1.3% suggesting that, on average, neither contributed significantly to
average TFP growth. The calculated kernel density for W∆ appears to be unimodal around its
mean, while the calculated kernel density for X∆ contains a hint of bimodality with some mass
concentrated slightly above the mean. Calculated kurtosis for W∆ is 15.4535, while calculated
kurtosis for X∆ is 9.7210.
Because weather effects are stochastic and beyond the control of the individual producer, ob-
serving that W∆ contributed relatively little to average productivity growth is not surprising. One
naturally expects relatively good and bad growing conditions to balance one another. Recalling
that X∆ accounts for scale-related differences associated with the differing input bundles between
the two time periods, the evidence suggests that the effect on observed TFP change over the 30
year periods was negligible.
Both calculated E∆ and T∆ measures have more platykurtic calculated kernel densities than
either X∆ and W∆ as is evidenced by a calculated kurtosis for E∆ of 5.0403 and for T∆ of
6.7822. The E∆ distribution is centered around a mean of −4.3% suggesting that over these 30
year periods, the average state struggled to adapt to the evolving productivity frontier. Moreover,
the lower tail of the E∆ distribution appears to be slightly thicker than its upper tail. This is not
inconsistent with the evidence reported in Figure 4 and suggests that the more innovative states
are gradually pulling away from the less innovative states. It conveys the sense that an increasing
number of states were failing to adapt to the ever-changing production environment at the end of
this thirty-year periods.
12A more complete summary of those results is available from the authors upon request.
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Again an obvious suspect for this struggle to adapt is weather. As noted, the directly calculated
W∆′s effects are quite small. But the results in Table 2 suggest that effi ciency levels are positively
correlated with the moisture variate and negatively correlated with the temperature variate. Nat-
urally, E∆, being derived from levels, would manifest a similar tendency. That implies that a
movement towards higher moisture levels, as has occurred, would push in the direction of more
effi cient production, a positive adaptation. On the other hand, the results in Table 2 also suggest
that the general trend to warmer temperatures might retard adaptation to the changing technical
frontier. Hence, there appears to be the potential for changing weather patterns to have a pull-push
effect on the rate at which states adapt to changing technical possibilities.
The calculated kernel densities for T∆ give slight evidence of bimodality with mass concentrated
near the calculated mean of 54.9% and around 63-65% hinting at a "twin peak" phenomenon
characterized by a group of more rapidly innovating states diverging from less rapidly innovating
states. The overall picture that emerges is one of technical innovation outpacing observed TFP
growth by approximately 5% over the 30 year periods with effi ciency loss (failure to adapt or adopt)
accounting for the bulk of the difference and weather being a slightly more important determinant
(again negative) of average TFP growth than input adjustments, but only marginally so.
Table 3 reports information on the average components of TFP change for these 14 30-year
periods for 21 states. There are four groupings of states. The first grouping consists of 7 states
that were leaders in terms of observed TFP at the beginning of our sample (1960) or at the end
of the sample (2004). The second group consists of TFP laggards at the beginning of the sample
(1960) or at the end of the sample (2004). The third group consists of states having the highest
average TFP growth between 1960 and 2004 (as calculated by USDA) and the final group consists
of those states having the slowest average TFP growth between 1960 and 2004 (as calculated by
USDA). There is some overlap between groups and so some states appear in more than one group.
For each state, their TFP rank in 1960 and 2004, their average (over the 14 separate 30-year
periods) TFP∆ score (not to be confused with the 1960-2004 change), their average E∆ score, their
average T∆ score, their average X∆ score, and their average W∆ score are all reported. The final
column in Table 3 reports calculated values for the observed coeffi cient of variation (in absolute
value terms) for theW∆ scores. Entries followed by a diamond, , indicate calculated average scores
taken over observations where infeasible calculations were reported. (Averages reflect averages only
on feasible scores in these instances. Thus, if there were 13 feasible scores and 1 infeasible score
the weighting factor for each observed score was 113 .)
A later section considers the infeasible calculations in more detail. But glancing at Table 3, one
cannot help but notice that more instances of calculated infeasibilities for W∆ are encountered in
the first group, the leading TFP states (five of the seven entries), than in any of the other groupings.
This suggests, as we indicated earlier, that these states who operated in the neighborhood of the
technical frontier in the 1960s likely encountered weather conditions in the 1990s that were outside
the realm of experience in the earlier part of the century.
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Looking at the first group, one sees that in 1960 the states with the highest observed TFP were,
in order, Florida, California, Arizona, Iowa, and Alabama. As already noted, Florida and California
had virtually identical TFP scores in 1960 while Arizona, Iowa, and Alabama fell somewhat further
behind. By 2004, California and Florida had switched places, Iowa was now third and virtually
tied with Illinois and Delaware had moved into fifth position from 6th in 1960. Meanwhile, Arizona
and Alabama had fallen to 11th and 8th, respectively.
Several characteristics of the changes for Arizona and Alabama, the states that fell out of the
top 5, are to be remarked. First, these states are in different regions of the country and have
different agricultures. As noted, Arizona’s livestock industry is concentrated in cattle and calves
while Alabama’s livestock production, which accounts for about 70-80% of its production value, is
heavily concentrated in poultry. The calculated average T∆ scores for both of these states is below
the national average of 54.9%. Alabama’s, at 51.4% is about 3.5 points below the national average,
and Arizona’s, at roughly 40%, is almost 15 points below the national average. The precise cause of
Arizona’s relatively slow rate of technical change cannot be determined from our data. But Arizona
clearly operated in a neighborhood of the frontier that was moving less quickly than more rapidly
developing neighborhoods. Its average E∆ score of about 1.5 indicates that it had moved closer to
the technical frontier in the 1990s than it had been in the 1960s and 1970s. Alabama, on the other
hand, realized an average T∆ score that was closer to the national average, but its average effi ciency
change score was approximately −8.5 percent. Technical improvements were available to Alabama,
but the state was not able to incorporate these technical improvements effectively into its production
practices as it fell behind the advancing frontier. Neither Alabama nor Arizona had relatively large
X∆ scores. Both were indicative of a negative scale effect, Alabama’s was almost imperceptible
while Arizona’s was larger at approximately -1.9%. Both states had average W∆ scores that were
approximately zero (not unexpected), and both experienced relatively more variability (as measured
by the coeffi cient of variation) than all of the leading TFP states except for Florida. Moreover, both
experienced instances of infeasibilities suggesting that the production conditions, including weather,
that they encountered in the 1990s were outside the range of technical experience in the earlier part
of our sample. Thus, while the average effect of weather on their calculated TFP growth seems
to be relatively small, clear evidence also exists that both states experienced somewhat different
production conditions at the end of the century than at the middle part of the century.
The two states that moved into the leading TFP group at the end of our sample period (Delaware
and Illinois) are quite dissimilar in size and in composition of their agricultural industries. Delaware
is heavily concentrated in broiler production with a relatively sizable concentration of grains and
oilseeds that support the broiler industry. Illinois’s primary production commodities are grains
and oilseeds and their main livestock industry is hog and pig production. Both states apparently
experienced worse operating weather conditions, on average, in the 1991-2004 era than in the 1961-
1974 era. Delaware’sW∆ score averaged−3.77% and Illinois’sW∆ score averaged−2.05%. Because
broiler production involves containment of the animals, the relatively large negative weather effect
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for Delaware may seem paradoxical at first glance. However, it must be remembered that TFP
accounts for both outputs and inputs. And thus, the observed warming of weather required larger
expenditures on climate control and disease control and helped retard TFP growth. As indirect
evidence of this effect, we note that for the 1990-2000 decade, the use of energy inputs by Delaware
agriculture grew at an average annual rate of 4.98%, which was the highest observed across the 48
contiguous states (New Mexico’s was second at 2.85%).
Over the 14 30-year periods, Illinois’s average TFP growth rate was very close to the national
average of 49%. Delawares was considerably lower at 42.9. Part of Illinois’s quicker growth is
explained by it experiencing a more rapid rate of technical change, 58.4%, than Delaware, 48.2%.
The former was about 3.5 points higher than the national average and the latter was about 6 points
below the national average. Interestingly, despite moving into the top 5 in terms of TFP, neither of
these states kept pace with the advancing technical frontier. Both experienced average E∆ scores
of approximately −11%. Delaware and Illinois differed dramatically in their size adjustments,
Delaware had an average X∆ of 13% suggesting that it successfully exploited available economies
of scale for x during these three decades. Illinois also experienced increasing frontier returns, but
at a much lower level of approximately 4%. The picture that emerges is of two states struggling
to adapt to the advancing technical frontier. One state, Delaware, compensates by more effective
exploitation of economies of scale, while the other, Illinois, benefits from a much more rapid rate of
technical change. And, in both instances, weather related changes dampened productivity growth
perceptibly.
The three states that appeared in the top five both at the beginning of our sample and at the
end of our sample, Florida, California, and Iowa are from very disparate regions of the country.
Two of these states, California and Iowa are the top agricultural producing states in the United
States. In 2012, with $42.6 billion in agricultural production value, California ranked first overall,
first in crop production, and third in livestock production. Iowa, with $30.8 billion in production
value, ranked second overall, second in crop production, and second in livestock production (behind
Texas). Florida, known for its relatively temperate climate and orange production (in which it ranks
first), is a moderately-sized agricultural state that falls just outside the top 20 in terms of total
production value.
Their observed patterns of TFP growth over the 14 30-year time periods, however, are quite dif-
ferent. California experienced extremely rapid technical change that averaged 65%, approximately
11 percentage points higher than the national average. It remained almost continuously on the
production frontier as its E∆ score was less than .8%. Thus, any reasonable interpretation of the
data suggests that it was directly responsible for many of the technical innovations that pushed
the technical frontier outward during that 30 year period. Its average W∆ score was 1.5% with a
coeffi cient of variation of 6.0 suggesting that weather, on average, was slightly better in production
terms in the 1991-2004 period than earlier and more variable than many states experienced, but
still relatively minor.
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The greatest drag on California’s productivity growth was its large (in absolute value terms)
and negative X∆. In each of the 14 30-year periods, its X∆ score was negative, and it averaged
−16%. Given its extremely large magnitude and the fact that California is virtually always on the
frontier, this effect requires further comment. Recall that the index measure is(
f0 (xt, w0) /xt




ft (xt, w0) /xt




which gives California’s average product for xt and x0 as measured relative to technology 0 and t.
There is thus a strong indication that aggregate input growth over these 30-year periods outstripped
maximal output growth. In 1960, the index of California aggregate input stood at 3.8835 (base
is Alabama in 1996). In 2004, it measured 5.0492, a roughly 30% increase. Our 30-year results
suggest that the associated growth in maximal output was considerably lower. This served as an
effective brake on California’s TFP growth despite its ability to make very rapid and significant
technical advances.
Iowa, on the other hand, experienced a much lower rate of technical change at 49%, about 5
percentage points below the national average. However, in each of the 14 30-year time periods, its
X∆ score was positive and averaged 8% overall indicating that it successfully exploited available
economies associated with x over the 30 time horizons. This adjustment was associated with a
downsizing of its "agricultural plant size". In 1960, its input index stood at 4.2611 and by 2004 that
had fallen to 3.3940. This observed input adjustment corresponds nicely with the "farm problem"
as it was perceived at the beginning of our sample. In the Kennedy era, the practical policy
problem for most of US agriculture was one of overproduction and "getting excess resources out
of agriculture" (Hillman 2011). The evidence suggests that Iowa made this adjustment effectively.
The ultimate consequence was its ability to maintain its role as an agricultural TFP leader despite
experiencing a relatively low rate of measured technical change.
Thus, where California relied on rapid technical change but seemingly allowed its plant size to
grow too quickly, Iowa streamlined its agricultural operations to maintain a high rate of produc-
tivity. While it is highly problematic to draw precise inferences from such aggregate data, one is
tempted to suggest that California’s experience may be indicative of extreme "research" success
but modest "educative" success. Iowa’s experience, on the other hand, might be indicative of "ed-
ucative" success but more modest "research" success. Given the nature of the data and the clear
lack of an explanatory model, it’s misleading to speak of "reasoning" here. But the heuristic is
that prior to 1960, Iowa may have overexpanded its "plant size". Eventually it adjusted by moving
resources out of agriculture. The exact process, of course, is something this study can say noth-
ing about. Clearly, competitive pressures were in play. On the other hand, technological advances
seemed to have been so rapid in California that they supplanted the need for some of its agricultural
"capacity" as measured by x.
Unlike California, Iowa tended to fall behind the advancing technical frontier. Its average E∆
score was -4.4% (approximately the same as the national average) suggesting that it was further from
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the effi cient frontier in the 1990s than it had been in the 1960s. Its average W∆ score was −2.5%
with a coeffi cient of variation of 3.5%. Iowa’s weather patterns, as measured in production terms,
were slightly less variable than experienced by California. And, unlike California, Iowa experienced
one instance (1963-1993 comparison) of an "infeasibility" in its W∆ calculation indicating that it
experienced production circumstances in 1993 that were outside the range of relevant production
experience in 1963. (More on this later.)
The characteristic that most distinguishes Florida’s TFP growth pattern from those of California
and Iowa is its W∆ score. Although, the average score is quite small, the coeffi cient of variation
at 28.6 is the largest reported in Table 3. Moreover, of the 14 30-year time periods, half were
characterized by W∆ infeasibilities indicating that Florida in the 1991-2004 period was operating
under quite different circumstances in terms of its input base than in 1961-1974. Florida was almost
exactly the "average" US state in terms of its observed T∆ score. Moreover, it remained almost
continuously on the technical frontier suggesting that its innovations, rather than those of others,
helped drive the placement of the frontier. The latter observation is particularly important in
light of the large number of observed infeasibilities. The operating conditions at the portion of the
frontier relevant for Florida in both the 1961-1974 period and the 1991-2004 were Florida’s.
Turning to the TFP laggards, first consider Louisiana. Although we report evidence on that
state’s TFP decompositions, we emphasize that the tabulated evidence for that state, apart from
the E∆, is borderline noninformative. The average reported is for a single observation, a direct
manifestations of "infeasiblities" for Louisiana’s 1991-2004 input combinations relative to the earlier
relevant technology (more on this later). Thus, all that can be said with confidence is that Louisiana,
whose 1960 TFP ranked 44th, had improved its TFP ranking to 37th for 2004. And, on average,
in the 1991-2004 period it operated closer to the frontier than in the earlier period.
Looking at the TFP laggard group, we next focus on Oregon and Michigan. Casting either
as "laggard" is problematic semantically. While both were TFP laggards in 1960, they had long
shriven that mantle by 2004. Over the intervening four decades, Oregon’s annual average growth
rate was the highest and Michigan’s was third highest with Rhode Island falling second.
For our three-decade periods, Oregon’s average rate of TFP change was 65% placing it 16 points
higher than the national average. That rapid growth rate was a combination of a slightly below
average T∆ effect (53%), a steady process of positive adaptation to new technologies (11% average
E∆), and very minor x−size effects, X∆, and weather effects. Michigan’s average rate of TFP
change for those three decades was 71%. That rapid growth rate was a combination of a higher
than average T∆ (58%), a steady movement towards the technical frontier (11% average E∆), a
positive X∆ effect (5%), and a small, but perceptible, weather component ( −3% average W∆).
The latter suggests that Michigan was forced to cope with more negative weather conditions in
1991-2004 than in the earlier periods.
Looking at the "other TFP laggards" reveals a distinct pattern: slow TFP∆ associated with
states failing to keep pace with the evolving technical frontier (E∆ quite negative). In the main,
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none of these laggard states experienced overly slow measured rates of technical change or much
poorer weather operating conditions. Rather frontier opportunities seemed available, but these
states were simply not capable of taking advantage of them. As already mentioned, other factors
beyond increasing technical incompetence may be at play. For example, these measures might
reflect institutional disparities across different states that prevent technology developed in one
setting being transferrable to others, so that the "measured" T∆ may be a misleading indicator of
availability of technical opportunities. Regardless of whether that is true and the effect represents
continued incompetence, what is undeniable is that these laggard states were incapable of keeping
pace agriculturally with other states. The anemic performances of Oklahoma and Wyoming are
particularly to be remarked. Both states had average TFP∆ scores of less than 30% for these three
decades while both experienced average E∆ scores well smaller than −20%. Where Oklahoma was
a relative TFP leader in 1960 (at number 13), it was racing to the bottom in these 30-year period
and had become an agricultural also-ran by 2004.
Examining the decompositions of TFP∆ for the remaining states in Table 3 reveals a very
clear pattern. None of the fastest or the slowest growing states experienced infeasibilities between
the two periods. This suggests, at least in terms of observed weather patterns, that these states
experienced weather patterns in the latter period that were relatively similar to those present in the
first period. With the exception of Colorado, the coeffi cient of variation for their W∆ scores were
below the national average indicative of relatively modulated weather patterns, at least as measured
by agricultural production effects. Several of the fastest growing states experienced perceptible
average W∆ effects. Indiana experienced a higher than average (in absolute value terms) negative
weather impact of approximately −3%. On the other hand, Massachussetts average W∆ effect was
strongly positive at approximately 7% and helped offset its negative size adjustment.
For most of the fastest-growing or slowest-growing states, the bulk of observed TFP∆ can be
attributed to either T∆ or E∆. Thus, the fastest growing states tended to experience quite rapid
technical change or to catch up with the technical frontier. On the other hand, the slowest growing
states typically experienced slightly above average to slightly below average T∆ but tended to
plunge away from the technical frontier as their E∆ scores fell well below the national average.
A clear message that emerges from Table 3 is that in terms of average TFP∆,most of the growth
that emerges or that fails to emerge can be attributed to either technical change, as measured by
T∆, and either successful adoption of available technical improvements or failure to adopt available
technical improvements as measured by E∆. W∆ is important for some states, but on average its
overall effect is relatively small. The same is true for X∆. And, in particular, it seems clear that
negative weather effects did not play a prominent role in contributing to poor TFP growth over
the long term in the slowest productivity-growing states. In short, slow growth is attributable to
either a failure to innovate or a failure to adapt innovations.
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3.3 Weather and the Distribution of TFP Growth
To gauge further the overall contribution that W∆ makes to agricultural TFP growth, we have
performed counterfactual experiments similar to ones employed by Kumar and Russell (2002) and
Henderson and Russell (2005). A key goal is to determine whether observed TFP growth can be
adequately explained by T∆, E∆, and X∆ without resorting to W∆. The results summarized
in Table 3 seem to suggest that this may be true but more can be said by looking at the entire
distribution of TFP∆ and its component parts.
Thus, for each state for each year between 1961 and 1974, we have taken state-level TFP and
multiplied it successively by one plus its measured 30-year percentage technical change, by one plus
its 30-year effi ciency change, and by one plus its 30 year X∆ score to arrive at a hypothetical TFP
that would have occurred in the absence of W∆ over the 30 years. This was done in stages, adding
in first the 30-year technical change, then the 30-year effi ciency change, and then the 30-year input
change. We also performed a similar experiment to determine whether T∆, E∆, and W∆ together
could account for observed productivity change without the presence of X∆. At each stage, we
conducted a nonparametric test of equality of the resulting hypothetical distribution with the true
TFP distribution for 1991-2004 (Li, Maasoumi, Racine 2009).13
The hypothesis test results are summarized in Table 4 and the results are illustrated graphically
in Figures 7 and 8. The null hypothesis for Table 4 and the figures is that the observed distribution
for TFP and the hypothetical distributions are the same. As both the table and the figures illus-
trate, this null hypothesis is rejected at all traditional levels of significance when the hypothetical
distribution only includes T∆. Differences remain to be explained. When E∆ is introduced, it
is no longer possible to reject the null hypotheses at traditional levels of significance. Thus, as a
practical matter, strong statistical discrimination between the observed TFP distribution and the
hypothetical distributions created by including T∆ and E∆ is not possible. Once again, the data
seem to suggest that in terms of aggregate behavior, the primary drivers of productivity change
are the abilities to innovate and to adapt to those innovations and not weather or size effects.
3.4 Infeasibilities and Indexing Weather
Recall that the weather index, (
f0 (xt, wt) ft (xt, wt)




is a cardinal index, measured in units of aggregate agricultural output, of the production effects of
(wt, w0) holding aggregate input at xt measured using the 0 technology and the t technology. If this
index is poorly defined, it communicates information about the technical feasibility of wt and w0
that is available from our conservative approximation to the underlying aggregate technology. By
the manner in which that approximation is developed, the component of the index defined relative
13Similar results were obtained using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and these are available from the authors upon
request.
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to the t technology, ft(xt,wt)ft(xt,w0) is always well defined. Thus, if an infeasibility occurs, it will be in the
component defined relative to the 0 technology, which in our case refers the technology that existed
in the 1961-1974 sub period.
We focus on the experience of 4 states: Arizona, Florida, Iowa, and Louisiana. Three of these
states (Arizona, Florida, and Louisiana) experienced large numbers of infeasibilities. Three of these
states routinely perform very close to the frontier (Arizona, Florida, and Iowa). One state (Arizona)
moved from being a relatively top-ranked state in terms of productivity to a lower ranking, two
(Florida and Iowa) did not, and one (Louisiana) was a relatively low-ranked state in productivity
terms for both periods.
Table 5 tabulates the years for which an infeasibility occurred. In every instance, the infeasi-
bilities occurred because we could not calculate f0 (xt, wt). Given that we have maintained free
disposability of x, this is not unexpected. Thus, the infeasibilities emerge from two sources: not
imposing free disposability on w and the fact that the weather variates in 1991-2004, were more
extreme than in 1961-1974. Producers faced different productive conditions in the latter period
than in the former. The fact that production continued in the second period implies that producers
adapted to these more extreme conditions in some fashion. A closer glimpse of how they adapted
can be gleaned from examining their relative experience.
Arizona and Florida experienced warmer operating conditions in 1991-2004. At the same time
Florida was quite wet, while Arizona experienced low humidity. As a consequence, f0 (xt, wt) was
often not producible using our conservative approximation to the technology. This happened to
Florida in 1991, 1994,1995, 1997, 1998, 2002, and 2003 and to Arizona in 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997,
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. During both the latter period and the former period, both states
stayed relatively close to the technical frontier, suggesting that they were doing the best that was
observed. Whether this was the best that was possible is something our analysis cannot determine.
Florida remained one of the top performers in TFP terms, although its TFP was quite variable. Its
productivity actually peaked at 1.79 in 2001 before falling back to its ending level in 2004. Arizona,
on the other hand, tumbled from third in the 1960 TFP rankings to eleventh (1.38) at the end of
the sample. Thus, evidence suggests the combination of increased heat stress and low humidity
were an important drag on Arizona’s TFP performance relative to that of Florida.
Louisiana experienced higher humidity in the latter period. Relative to what occurred in 1961-
2004, these conditions were so extreme that the weather index could be computed in only one year.
And for that instance, the computed effect was quite negative. Louisiana was somewhat of a TFP
also-ran in 1960 and largely remained one.
That brings us to Iowa. Its sole infeasibility occurred in 1993. That summer massive flooding
in Iowa caused at least 17 fatalities and over $2 billion in damages. In some areas of the state, it
rained 130 consecutive days and flooding occurred multiple times. The experience was so significant
that Iowa Homeland Security and Management has called it "...one of the most defining natural
disaster incidents in Iowa history". The agricultural response was a massive drop in yields. But as
21
already noted, after its recovery, Iowa remained a TFP leader at the end of our sample period.
4 Concluding Remarks
Methods for approximating the aggregate stochastic agricultural technology that incorporate weather
elements directly into the approximation were developed. Using the aggregate technology as the
reference base, the traditional measure of agricultural TFP growth was decomposed into four com-
ponents (weather, technological change, effi ciency, and input). Using the USDA state-level TFP
panel combined with data drawn from Schlenker and Roberts (2008; 2009), decomposition analyses
of observed 30 year changes in agricultural TFP for each of the 48 contiguous US states have been
performed and analyzed.
Before summarizing results, it is important to emphasize this study’s intent. The analysis is
not meant to explain what drives TFP growth. That craft is left to others. We do note, however,
that its execution typically requires different and more restrictive assumptions than ours. Our goal
is more conservative: to examine empirically the different components of observed TFP change.
In the end, the intended result is essentially an empirical exercise in blackboard economics. To
visualize, draw ft (xt, w) on two axes holding xt constant while varying w. One component of the
weather index, ft (xt, wt) /ft (xt, w0) , is measured as relative lengths along the horizontal axis. All
of the remaining components of our indices are illustrated similarly.
Thus, rather than explaining TFP growth, our intent is to use index procedures to get different
empirical snapshots of how agricultural TFP is changing. The basic idea follows Polya’s (1945)
heuristic for problem solving. Start by identifying what is known and what is unknown. Then
determine the question that needs to be answered, what is needed to answer the question, and
what constitutes an answer. Our goal is to contribute to the first stage in the process. Before
attempting to isolate causal factors, the goal is a more precise understanding of what has actually
happened. After that is known more precisely, the proper search for causality can commence.
The results indicate that the pattern of average state-level TFP growth and the distribution of
that growth are closely approximated by the patterns of the technical change, T∆, and effi ciency
change, E∆, components of the decomposition. A shift in the frontier of the technology made
it possible, on average, to get about 1.54 times as much product in 1991-2004 than was possible
in 1961-74. At the same time, E∆ was negative on average and slowed measured TFP growth.
That change was also evocative of a more diffuse effi ciency distribution. Fewer states perform
in the neighborhood of the technical frontier and more states lag behind. Thus, the observed
increased diffusion of state-level TFP (Figure 2) seems mainly comprised of a combination of fewer
innovative states and more states struggling to maintain pace with an ever advancing frontier.
There is clear evidence of bimodality in the distribution of effi ciency with which states exploit
the technology. Moreover, that bimodality seems to have shifted towards a lower concentration
of technically effi cient states and greater concentration of laggard states. Some evidence of the
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emergence of a "twin peak" phenomenon in technical innovation, T∆, also exists. In terms of what
can be inferred from our data, W∆ and X∆ do not appear to have been important components of
observed differences in the changes of the distribution of TFP.
In pivoting from an examination of the grouped data to a closer examination of state-level
performance, clear differences emerge. Some states have experienced both positive and negative
W∆ effects. A number of states on the technical frontier experienced weather conditions in 1991-
2004 that were so different from 1961-1974 that our conservative methodology does not permit
calculation of weather-related effects on agricultural TFP in some time periods. Of the three
leading TFP states (California, Florida, and Iowa), this indeterminacy was most pronounced for
Florida, was not experienced for California, and was experienced only once for Iowa (the result of
a massive flood event). Arizona, a TFP leader in 1960, encountered this phenomenon repeatedly
as a consequence of increased heat stress in 1991-2004. Having started our sample period (1960)
ranked third in observed TFP, it had fallen to eleventh in 2004.
As always, caveats exist and further research is needed. Our analysis is aggregate. And while this
has desirable characteristics in terms of providing a broader perspective on "what’s going on with
agriculture and weather", it has well-known drawbacks. It is not intended to and does not pretend
to supplant continued disaggregate analyses. On the other hand, very few truly relevant aggregate
conclusions can be drawn from very disaggregate analysis. Moving from the highly disaggregate to
the aggregate requires well-defined and conceptually consistent aggregation schemes. Even though
it is not simply a matter of "adding up effects", an inescapable reality is that most "aggregation"
schemes eventually require summing somewhere in the procedure. Once imposed anywhere in the
scheme, it has been well-known since the time of Gorman (1953, 1968) that some form linearity
elsewhere is a prerequisite for consistent aggregability. And in that regard, weather promises to
be particularly problematic because its potential impacts on agricultural systems are likely quite
nonlinear. And so, for example, knowing what’s happening in Montgomery County, Maryland
weather may not prove particularly informative nationally. And knowing what’s going on at the
farm or field level is potentially even less informative.
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Figure 1: Annual growth rates of total factor productivity, U.S. agriculture, 1949-2013
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(c) Solution to infeasibility problem
Figure 3: The infeasibility problem given two combinations of inputs and output for one state at
different time periods
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Figure 4: Smoothed kernel densities of efficiency scores, comparison 1991-2004 and 1961-1974
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b) Moisture in the US (g/L) 


















Figure 5: Kernel densities of temperature and moisture, comparison 1991-2004 and 1961-1974
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Figure 6: Decomposition changes in the United States between 1991-2004 and 1961-1974, kernel
densities
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Figure 7: Counterfactual decomposition changes in the United States between 1991-2004 and 1961-
1974, kernel densities
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Figure 8: Counterfactual decomposition changes in the United States between 1991-2004 and 1961-
1974, kernel densities
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Table 1: Summary statistics of efficiency scores 1961-1974 and 1991-2004
1961-1974 1991-2004 1961-1974 1991-2004
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
ALL US 0.7058 0.1663 0.6814 0.1725
AL 0.7215 0.1325 0.6626 0.1037 NC 0.7972 0.0625 0.8508 0.0696
AR 0.7003 0.0592 0.7247 0.0435 ND 0.5607 0.0782 0.5855 0.0555
AZ 0.9392 0.0586 0.9612 0.0660 NE 0.7037 0.0599 0.7062 0.0574
CA 0.9990 0.0037 1.0000 0.0477 NH 0.5688 0.0456 0.5066 0.0409
CO 0.6468 0.0236 0.5786 0.0379 NJ 0.6896 0.0865 0.6842 0.0441
CT 0.6391 0.1147 0.6575 0.0574 NM 0.5237 0.0323 0.5272 0.0316
DE 0.9938 0.0114 0.8833 0.1013 NV 0.8603 0.0813 0.8985 0.1077
FL 0.9989 0.0041 0.9947 0.0155 NY 0.8056 0.0759 0.6463 0.0848
GA 0.7614 0.0616 0.8234 0.0575 OH 0.6618 0.0603 0.6484 0.0813
IA 0.9916 0.0245 0.9487 0.0552 OK 0.5526 0.0473 0.4387 0.0204
ID 0.7093 0.0295 0.7430 0.0365 OR 0.5533 0.0468 0.6200 0.0495
IL 0.9081 0.0577 0.8146 0.0760 PA 0.6582 0.0726 0.6148 0.0760
IN 0.7281 0.0722 0.7180 0.0764 RI 0.9908 0.0343 0.9423 0.1188
KS 0.6944 0.0575 0.6112 0.0485 SC 0.7031 0.1063 0.8122 0.1077
KY 0.6313 0.1146 0.5865 0.0475 SD 0.5976 0.0506 0.5757 0.0330
LA 0.7278 0.2064 0.7152 0.1040 TN 0.5690 0.0634 0.4836 0.0515
MA 0.6723 0.1067 0.6882 0.1092 TX 0.9712 0.0350 0.9101 0.0851
MD 0.6415 0.0424 0.6298 0.0368 UT 0.5816 0.0440 0.5225 0.0404
ME 0.6876 0.1110 0.6029 0.0689 VA 0.5814 0.0211 0.6012 0.0369
MI 0.5373 0.0267 0.6033 0.0433 VT 0.6693 0.0548 0.5795 0.0361
MN 0.7860 0.0851 0.8159 0.0477 WA 0.7035 0.0420 0.7380 0.0408
MO 0.6505 0.0699 0.5502 0.0470 WI 0.7975 0.0703 0.7365 0.0603
MS 0.6296 0.0787 0.6354 0.0923 WV 0.3999 0.1737 0.3508 0.0259
MT 0.5198 0.0321 0.4303 0.0379 WY 0.4624 0.0195 0.3499 0.0180
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Table 2: Bias-corrected regression results correlating efficiency to weather
Period: 1961-2004 Coefficient R2
Temperature -0.00015 *** 0.01260
Moisture 0.04064 ***
Constant -0.54670 ***
Period: 1961-1974 Coefficient R2
Temperature -0.00043 *** 0.01185
Moisture 0.07633 ***
Constant -0.99701 ***
Period 1991-2004 Coefficient R2
Temperature -0.00014 *** 0.02540
Moisture 0.04182 ***
Constant -0.41733 ***
∗ ∗ ∗ indicates significance at 1% level. ∗∗ indicates significance at 5% level and ∗ indicates significance at 10% level.
10
Table 3: Decomposed changes for specific groups of US States
Rank
1960 2004 TFP ∆ E ∆ T ∆ X ∆ W ∆ CVW ∆
TOP TFP
AL 5 8 0.4340 -0.0853 0.5143  -0.0029  -0.0017  21.5720
AZ 3 19 0.4284 0.0148 0.4033  -0.0194  -0.0028  13.5120
CA 2 1 0.4985 0.0089 0.6502 -0.1684 0.0156 6.0103
DE 6 5 0.4296 -0.1113 0.4824 0.1317 -0.0377  2.2540
FL 1 2 0.4784 0.0068 0.5432  -0.0559 -0.0033  28.6553
IA 4 3 0.4803 -0.0439 0.4918  0.0817 -0.0257  3.5024
IL 7 4 0.4992 -0.1110 0.5844 0.0463 -0.0206 6.2889
BOTTOM TFP
LA 44 37 0.5024 0.0105 0.5864  -0.1136 -0.0873  NA
MI 47 28 0.7140 0.1145 0.5814 0.0510 -0.0330 2.4960
MT 42 44 0.3470 -0.1906 0.5425 -0.0003 -0.0046 4.7860
NH 45 35 0.4288 -0.1159 0.6199  -0.0513 -0.0270 2.1980
OK 13 45 0.2949 -0.2285 0.5195 0.0019 0.0020 8.8600
WV 48 47 0.4843 -0.0838 0.5561  -0.0055 -0.0056 1.0590
WY 43 48 0.2363 -0.2790 0.5183 0.0012 0.0217 5.2720
TN 39 46 0.4184 -0.1625 0.5785 0.0086 -0.0174 5.6560
OR 46 15 0.6535 0.1143 0.5348 0.0027 0.0018 6.3620
FASTEST TFP RATE of ∆ 1960-2004
IN 27 7 0.6123 -0.0151 0.6245 0.0395 -0.0362 3.5819
OR 46 15 0.6535 0.1143 0.5348 0.0027 0.0018 6.3620
MA 28 10 0.5608 0.0231 0.5483 -0.0425 0.0742 3.2400
MI 47 28 0.7140 0.1145 0.5814 0.0510 -0.0330 2.4960
SLOWEST TFP RATE of ∆ 1960-2004
CO 9 32 0.4218 -0.1128 0.5409 -0.0001 0.0004 18.2950
KS 8 36 0.3887 -0.1275 0.5749 -0.0296 -0.0291 3.2410
OK 13 35 0.2949 -0.2285 0.5195 0.0019 0.0020 8.8600
TN 39 46 0.4184 -0.1625 0.5785 0.0086 -0.0174 5.6560
WY 43 48 0.2363 -0.2790 0.5183 0.0012 0.0217 5.2720
Average (48) 0.4965 -0.0438 0.5495 0.0018 -0.0131 7.2070
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Table 4: Li tests on counterfactual 30-year decomposition changes between 1991-2004 and 1961-
1974
All 48 US States
Null Hypothesis (H0) Statistic p-value
f( ytxt ) = h
T ( y0x0 ∗ exp(T∆t,0)) 2.1836 0.0000
f( ytxt ) = h
E( y0x0 ∗ exp(T∆t,0) ∗ exp(E∆t,0)) -4.2246 0.2080
f( ytxt ) = h
X( y0x0 ∗ exp(T∆t,0) ∗ exp(E∆t,0) ∗ exp(X∆t,0)) -2.6611 0.3660
f( ytxt ) = h
W ( y0x0 ∗ exp(T∆t,0) ∗ exp(E∆t,0) ∗ exp(W∆t,0)) -1.3766 0.5840
Note: The function f is a (kernel) function for the actual data in 1991-2004,
while hT , hE , hX , and hW are (kernel) counterfactual distributions obtained
by adjusting the 1961-1974 data for the effects of technological change (hT ),
efficiency and technological changes (hE), efficiency, technological and input
changes (hX), and efficiency, technological and weather changes (hW ), respectively.
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Table 5: Infeasible cases by state in decomposition changes, 1991-2004 on 1961-1974






Note: All cases of infeasibility are caused by the impossibility of computing the
following element in the proposed decomposition: f0 (xt, wt).
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